2. Objections and their Solution

44. On the contrary:

A sin is not made worse by that by which, when it does not exist, nay when its opposite exists, the sin is as equally or more grave. If this person had not been penitent before, nay had always been innocent, and if now he sin, he would sin more gravely than he sins now;     therefore etc     . [sc. therefore a penitent does not (contrary to n.43) sin more because he sins after penitence]. Proof of the minor, because he who falls from a state of innocence sins more gravely than he who falls from a state of penitence, both because he for whom God has preserved innocence receives a greater benefit than he to whom God conceded penitence after sin, and because the innocent has less occasion for falling.

45. Again, when one falls from penitence one does not have to sin necessarily with two sins at the same time;     therefore it is possible to sin with a single sin only; but by that one sin one could, by falling before from innocence, have sinned as equally gravely - as is plain by comparing it to any intensity of malice that belongs to sin;A sin from a state of penitence could be as evil as a sin from a state of innocence as regard the intensity of the malice it involves. Therefore again (contrary to n.43) a sin from a state of penance need not be worse than a sin from a state of innocence. ⁷¹ therefore etc     .

46. [To the first] - As to the first [n.44]: I concede that to preserve innocence is a simply greater divine benefit than to allow penitence after sin. Hence God conferred a greater benefit on his Mother than on Mary Magdalene. Hence it is a singular glory and ornament in the blessed never to have fallen into sin.

47. And then to the argument: I deny the major, because it is possible for some sin to have now one circumstance making it worse and now another, and the one that makes it worse there can be graver than the one that makes it worse here; and these two circumstances can be repugnant to each other. And so here, the fact that penitence precedes makes sin worse, because it bestows ingratitude on it.

48. Likewise, to fall from innocence, because of the ingratitude, makes sin worse, and innocence and penitence are in a way repugnant; but to fall simply from innocence makes sin worse more.

49. But on the contrary is the verse of Luke 7.42-43: when about two debtors, one of whom the creditor forgave more to and the other less to, Christ asked Simon the question who would love the creditor more, Simon replied, “I suppose he to whom he gave more.” And the Lord approved this and said, “You have judged rightly.” But God gives nothing to the innocent in this way, and to the sinner he gives many things; therefore, a sinner is more bound to God, wherefore he is more ungrateful simply when he falls back.

50. I reply: ‘to give’ can be understood absolutely, as it is an act of will freely communicating something, or as in ‘to condone’ or ‘to remit’, the way it is taken when it is said ‘he for-gave sins’. In the first way it is true that he to whom more is given is more bound to the giver, and in this way I say that God gave a greater gift to the innocent than to him for whom he remitted sin. In the second way, God gives more to the penitent than to the innocent, because the innocent does not have what may in this way be ‘for-given’ him. And if the major then is taken, namely that ‘he is bound to love more who has been given, that is, remitted more’, it is true that, when comparing the two, less is given to one of them and more to the other, and this if the only benefit given were only what is meant by ‘to remit’.

51. But there is no one to whom God for-gives few things (because he has committed few things) without some other gift being given to the same person, a gift greater than ‘to for-give’ (that is, to remit) more things, namely to preserve him from other things into which he could or would have fallen if he had not been preserved by God.

52. This agrees with the gloss of Augustine on Luke 7.47 [Sermons on Scripture, Sermo 99 ch.6 n.6], “things committed and things not committed are for-given,” because “there is no one who commits something without someone else being able, unless he were preserved, to commit the same thing.” Therefore he for whom they are dismissed is bound to love more, supply, ‘by reason of the remission’. But the other is bound to love for another reason, that he did not have things that needed to be dismissed, which was through divine preservation. And this reason requires a simply greater gratitude.

53. An example of this: if someone from his liberality concedes to someone all his property to use at will, but to another concedes some things as a loan and later, when he must repay them, remits them for him - who will love him more? I say that the first will, because he received a greater benefit, and yet more is remitted to the other. But the fact that the first has nothing needing to be dismissed for him, this is by the favor of him who freely conceded to him all his property.

54. Hence the proposition that ‘he for whom more is dismissed loves more the forgiver’ is only simply true of the forgiver by whose favor it is not the case that the one is not bound to as many things as the other is.

55. [To the second]: As to the second [n.45] I say that it is possible for a recidivist to sin with many sins, or as it were with many sins, if he deliberately act against the common law and against the law of gratitude and against the law of promises. But commonly the sin is not done in this way, because a sinner commonly desires only delight (though in disordered fashion), and he does not will that so many prohibitions be annexed to the delight. And to every sin is in this way conjoined disobedience and contempt and hatred of God and ingratitude and the like - not that the sinner have then an elicited act pertaining to each one of these, but he does implicitly insofar as he wills something to which all these are concomitant. I concede, therefore, that it is possible for a recidivist to sin with a single sin.

56. And when you infer ‘therefore he could have sinned equally gravely with that one sin when he fell from innocence’ - I concede it as far as concerns this part of the circumstance, namely of ingratitude and multiple obligation; yet he would have more gravely sinned then as concerns another circumstance, that he is more ungrateful in falling from innocence than in falling from penitence.

57. But on the contrary: suppose that he was penitent ten times, and on each occasion about ten mortal sins; after the tenth penitence he falls away sinning with as much lust as he sinned with in the first sin; then this sin will be one hundred times more grave than the first sin, because he is bound, by reason of each dismissed sin, not to fall, and so by reason of any of them there is a special ingratitude in falling; and he is bound not to sin by reason of any penitence, in which he promised not to sin.

58. I reply: no new fault is thus grave by some circumstance respecting a preceding penitence, because the circumstance may equal the gravity of the sin in itself or in its malice, and not perhaps in a hundredth part. Yet I concede that this circumstance of ingratitude and promise makes the sin worse - and the graver the more the good first conferred on him was not due (which is regularly the case of him who had more gravely sinned), and the more he promised many times (which is regularly the case of him who repented many times).